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Abstract—Data outsourcing offers cost-effective computing
power to manage massive data streams and reliable access
to data. For example, data owners can forward their data to
clouds, and the clouds provide data mirroring, backup, and
online access services to end users. However, outsourcing data
to untrusted clouds requires data authentication and query
integrity to remain in the control of the data owners and users.
In this paper, we address this problem specifically for multi-
version key-value data that is subject to continuous updates
under the constraints of data integrity, data authenticity, and
“freshness” (i.e., ensuring that the value returned for a key is
the latest version). We detail this problem and propose INCBM-
TREE, a novel construct delivering freshness and authenticity.
Compared to existing work, we provide a solution that
offers (i) lightweight signing and verification on massive data
update streams for data owners and users (e.g., allowing
for small memory footprint and CPU usage on mobile user
devices), (ii) integrity of both real-time and historic data, and
(iii) support for both real-time and periodic data publication.
Extensive benchmark evaluations demonstrate that INCBM-
TREE achieves more throughput (in an order of magnitude)
for data stream authentication than existing work. For data
owners and end users that have limited computing power,
INCBM-TREE can be a practical solution to authenticate the
freshness of outsourced data while reaping the benefits of
broadly available cloud services.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the big data era, data sources generate data of large
variety, volume, and at a high arrival rate. Such intensive
data streams are widely observed in system logs, network
monitoring logs, social application logs, and many others.
In order to efficiently digest the large data streams, which
can be beyond a regular data owner’s computing capability,
outsourcing data and computation to clouds becomes a
promising approach. Clouds can provide sufficient storage
and computing capabilities with the help of large data centers
and scalable networked software. By delegating processing,
storing, and query serving of data streams to a third-party
service, the data outsourcing paradigm not only relieves a
data owner of the cumbersome management work but also
saves significant operational cost.
For example, stock exchange service providers, social
networking companies, and network monitoring companies
can benefit from outsourcing their streaming data to clouds.
In a stock exchange market, stock buyers and sellers make
deals based on the changing price. To identify stock mar-
ket trends, stock buyers may frequently consult exchange
providers about historical and real-time stock prices. With a
large number of stocks, the footprint of the stock price data
would easily grow out of a regular company’s computing
capability or its IT budget. Moreover, as there are more and
more stock brokers in the market, it requires huge computing
power to serve such a large customer base. Another example
is a social networking website where the stream of social
application events arrive at a high rate. At an online auction
website, bid proposals are continuously generated, which
can easily exceed the limit of the server capability of the
operating company. Big data streams can be also observed
in a network monitoring scenario where a company monitors
its real-time network traffic.
Despite its advantages, data outsourcing causes issues of
trust, because the cloud, being operated by a third-party
entity, is not fully trustworthy. A cloud company could
deliver incomplete query results to save computation cost
or even maliciously manipulate data for financial incentives,
e.g., to gain an unfair advantage by colluding with a data
user competing with the rest. Therefore, it is imperative for
a data owner to protect data authenticity and freshness when
outsourcing its data to a third-party cloud.
It is crucial to assure temporal freshness of data, i.e.,
obtain proofs that the server does not omit the latest data
nor return out-of-date data. Especially when the value of
the data is subject to continuous updates, it is not sufficient
to guarantee only the correctness of data because a data
client1 expects to obtain the “freshest” data. For example, a
data user can query the latest price of a stock, the latest bid
towards the purchase of a product in an auction, or the sensor
readings of any monitored attributes at a specific time.
While a large corpus of work including [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7] focused on authentication of dynamic data,
efficient freshness authentication still remains as a chal-
lenging and understudied problem. Freshness authentication
essentially requires signing the relationships between a data
version and any time point when the version is valid. There
are two main approaches to sign the relationship. First,
a key-based signing approach is used for authenticating






















Figure 1: System of outsourced key-value stores
dynamic data [3], [8] and aggregated information [9], [10].
The approach periodically signs the latest value with the
current time so that freshness of the value is guaranteed at
the granularity of the signing time interval. Even though this
approach offers a data client with efficient verification, it is
impractical for intensive data streams because it requires a
data owner to keep a local copy of the entire dataset. Second,
a time-based signing approach is used for authenticating data
streams [11]. The approach signs a sequence of incoming
data, and provides a data owner with efficient signing since
it does not require a local copy of the entire dataset. This
approach, however, could impose significant verification
overhead on a data client since all previous data have to
be retrieved for verification. Due to the limitation, freshness
authentication is provided only for recent data within a
sliding window [11].
In this paper, we propose a novel authentication frame-
work for multi-version key-value data streams. We note
that freshness verification overhead in existing work is high
because it lacks the capability to perform an efficient non-
membership test, e.g., there were no updates on the value of
key k within last 5 minutes. We formalize the problem in
§II and introduce a novel construct INCBM-TREE in §III to
address the problem. INCBM-TREE uses a Bloom filter [12]
for freshness authentication while enabling lightweight sign-
ing and optimized verification. Conceptually, INCBM-TREE
is a Merkle Hash tree (MHT) [13] that embeds a hierarchy
of Bloom filters (BFs). In INCBM-TREE, a MHT signs
and protects authenticity of data streams along with their
associated BFs, whereas BFs provide efficient verification
for version freshness. Furthermore, we design INCBM-
TREE in such a way that it can be incrementally constructed
and maintained so that signing data stream can be done
efficiently without accessing historical data. We summarize
the comparison of INCBM-TREE with existing work in
Table I, where +/– denotes that an approach support/does
not support a feature.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows.
Table I: Comparing INCBM-TREE with prior work
Data Approaches Version Lightweight Efficient
Model freshness signing verification
Stream [11] + + –
Agg [9], [10] – + +
Dynamic [8], [3] + – –
Data INCBM-TREE + + +
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
efficiently solve the problem of outsourcing multi-
version key-value stores with verifiable freshness, en-
abling devices with limited computation capabilities to
leverage cloud-based data management while relying
on the freshness and authenticity of the outsourced data.
• We design a generic Put/Get interface for outsourced
data retrieval, which differentiates itself from sliding
window queries [11] and aggregation queries [10], [9]
on outsourced data.
• We define the authenticity property in the new problem
setting.
• We propose a novel construct INCBM-TREE to authen-
ticate version freshness, which dramatically reduces
freshness verification and does not incur disk I/O over-
head.
• We evaluate or implementation of INCBM-TREE and
our results confirm that it applies to generic key-
value stores, offering more throughput (in an order of




Figure 1 illustrates our system model. In this ecosystem,
there are three parties in different administrative domains:
• a data owner, e.g., a small technology start-up company
• a data user, e.g., a customer of the company
• a public cloud, offering data storage and management
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Note that both the data owner and the data user do not
fully trust a public cloud as it is operated by a third-party
company with its own interests, partially conflicting with
those of the small start-up company.
In this scenario, the data owner outsources a key-value
dataset to a public cloud, and each stream unit is an update
to a key-value record in the dataset, submitted by the
data owner to the public cloud. In order to provide data
authenticity, a data owner employs a signer to sign the raw
data stream before publishing it to a cloud (steps 1 and
2 ). The data user typically uses the Put/Get interface to
access the key-value dataset.
The data user issues Get queries to the outsourced key-
value store in the public cloud. The usual query path returns
a result of interests (steps 3 , 4 , and 5 ), and an additional
verification path (steps 5’ , 6’ , and 7’ ). A prover in a
cloud composes a proof and delivers it to the data user’s
verifier, which verifies the authenticity of the query results
for the data user. We assume that the data user knows the
public key of the data owner, and that the signer and the
verifier are time-synchronized (e.g., using a trusted network
time services) for freshness authentication. Details of the
authentication framework will be discussed in §II-E.
B. Data Model
Our data model is a multi-version key-value data stream.
We require that the signature for the data is publicly veri-
fiable. Without losing generality, we consider a basic key-
value data model where each object has a unique key k, a
value v, and an associated timestamp ts. v can be updated
multiple times. This basic data model can be easily extended
to support more advanced key-value models, such as the
column-family model, by multiplying the data model for
each column.
1) Query Model: We focus on the selection query with
time awareness. Given key k and timestamp ts, the query
returns the latest version of the object associated with key k
by ts. The API, modeled after the generic Put/Get interface
in key-value stores [14], [15], [16], [17], is defined as
follows.
VGet(k, ts) → 〈v, tslatest〉 ∪ π(k, v, tslatest, ts)
Here, π is a proof presented by a cloud to a data user. If
unspecified, the default value of ts is the current timestamp
tsnow. This API is primitive to many selection SQL queries
and can add time-awareness. Our model considers both
continuous and one-time queries.
C. Threat Model
We assume a threat model where neither the data user
nor the public cloud service is trusted by the data owner.
We assume that the adversary (e.g., having compromised
the cloud service) may deliberately conceal certain versions
of data by excluding them from responses to data users. The
adversary may also manipulate data values before presenting
them to the querying user. Further, we assume that an
adversarial cloud service may collude with malicious data
users, trying to obtain the data owner’s secret key so that it
can forge a proof for compromised data. In our solution, we
use public-key signature so that only public key is released
to the data user and cloud.
1) Security Goals: Based on our query and threat models,
there are two desirable properties to be guaranteed.
Definition 2.1: Given a query key k in our data model,
the cloud may return multiple versions updated at different
points in time {〈v, ts〉}. For a timestamp tsquery, a version
〈v, ts〉 is
• fresh if and only if 〈v, ts〉 is the latest version updated
before tsquery and
• correct if and only if 〈v, ts〉 is indeed a version that
belongs to the key k and was submitted by the data
owner.
D. Cryptographic Essentials
We introduce a set of cryptographic tools used throughout
the remaining of the paper.
1) Hash Function: A hash function H(·) takes a variable-
length input x and generates a fixed-length output y = H(x).
A hash can be efficiently computed. Hash functions used in
this work are assumed to be collision resistant, which means
that it is computationally infeasible to find two different
inputs x 6= x′ such that H(x) = H(x’), e.g., SHA1.
2) Digital Signature: A public-key digital signature
scheme provides data integrity and ownership of the signed
data. After creating a pair of keys (SK,PK), the signer
keeps the secret key SK , and publishes the public key PK .
A signature sig(x, SK) is produced for a message x, and
a recipient of the message can verify its integrity and the
ownership of x by using sig(x, SK) and PK . Note that
signing is typically much more expensive than hashing.
3) Merkle Tree: A Merkle hash tree (MHT) [13] is
a method of collectively authenticating a set of objects.
Specifically, being a binary balanced tree structure, each leaf
node of MHT corresponds to the hash of an object, and
each non-leaf node corresponds to the hash (digest) of the
concatenation of its direct children’s hashes. The root node
corresponds to the digital signature of the root digest. To
prove the authenticity of any object, the prover provides the
verifier with the object itself and the digests of the siblings
of the nodes that lie in the path from the root. By iteratively
computing and concatenating the appropriate hashes, the
verifier can then recompute the root digest and verify its
correctness using its digital signature.
4) KOMT: A key-ordered Merkle tree (KOMT) is an
approach of using a Merkle tree to sign data batches, e.g.
for authenticating data streams. Given a batch of data records
with key attributes, a KOMT sorts the data based on the key
and hashes each leaf node with its two neighboring nodes,
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i.e., the predecessor and the successor in the sorted order.
This allows to easily verify whether a range of keys or a
specific key is in the current dataset or not.
E. Authentication Framework
Based on our data model, we now describe the authen-
tication framework. As illustrated in Figure 1, the stream
of data updates is generated by the data owner and is
signed by a signer in the owner domain (step 1 ). The
signer signs the streaming updates in a batch. Given a
batch of updates b in the stream, the signer builds a digest
structure dd (e.g. a Merkle tree), and signs the digest
sig(dd, SK). In particular, the digest of the batch dd
includes the root of the constructed digest structure d, the
current timestamp tsend, and the timestamp of the last batch
tsstart. That is, dd = tsstart‖tsend‖d. The signature of the
batch is published along with the raw data stream to a cloud
(step 2 ). Upon receiving the signed updates stream, the
cloud materializes them in key-value stores. To accommo-
date the intensive data stream, a write-optimized key-value
store (e.g., BigTable [14], HBase [15], Cassandra [16] and
LevelDB [17]) can be used. These key-value stores optimize
the write operations by their append-only designs which
typically results in the co-existence of multiple versions
given a single data record in the store. In the signed data
stream, the raw data updates are applied to a base table in the
key-value store, and the signatures are stored in a meta-data
table. The digest structures, which are not transmitted to a
cloud for the sake of bandwidth efficiency, are reconstructed
on the cloud side from the raw data updates, and then stored
in another meta-data table. The following interface shows
how to persist key-value data and meta-data in the store.
BaseTable.Put(k, v, ts) (1)





While the data owner sends the data streams to the cloud,
a data user can issue a VGet(k,ts) query to the cloud (step
3 ). A query engine server in a cloud processes the query
by interacting with the key-value store (step 4 ) and returns
the result to the user (step 5 ). At the same time, the query
engine prompts the prover to prepare the proof for the query
result (step 5’ ). The proof includes signatures and a specific
digest structure that links signatures to the result data. After
the proof is sent to the verifier in the data user domain
(step 6’ ), the verifier validates the result and provides the
authenticity test result to the user (step 7’ ).
Given a query and its result VGet(k,ts)→ 〈v, tslatest〉,
the proof π(k, v, tslatest, ts) needs to satisfy two properties:
the correctness ensuring that 〈v, tslatest〉 is a valid version
published by the data owner, and the freshness ensuring that
the returned version 〈v, tslatest〉 is indeed the latest version
of key k as of time ts. Proving the freshness of v requires
verifying that there is no version update of key k between
tslatest and ts. A naive proof includes all the data updates
or versions within the time interval with their signatures to
the verifier. This is too expensive for massive data streams,
especially if for keys that are updated infrequently. In this
work, we make the key observation that a version freshness
verification is essentially equivalent to a “non-membership”
test between a time interval, i.e., there doesn’t exist a version
〈v′, ts′〉 such that tslatest < ts
′ ≤ ts.
We assume that the signer and the verifier are time
synchronized so that the freshness can be verified2. This
assumption can be satisfied by using a trusted time server
(e.g., NIST Internet Time Server3). In addition, we assume
that data owners are independent of each other, that is,
different stream owners have their own signature keys and
independently publish the streaming data to a cloud. Dif-
ferent owners’ streaming data is stored and served indepen-
dently by the cloud service. This is a common scenario in
outsourced cloud operations for privacy reasons.
Our framework for authenticating key-value stores is more
flexible and lightweight than existing stream/data authenti-
cation frameworks in an outsourced database. Compared to
stream authentication [11] where a sliding window query is
supported only on recent data, our framework allows access
to both recent and historic data. Compared to dynamic data
authentication [8], [3], our framework does not require local
materialization of the whole dataset (or its latest snapshot)
on the data owner side, thereby being more lightweight and
practical in the streaming scenario.
III. INCBM-TREE
A. The Need for Large Signing Batch
In our authentication framework, a big batch size is critical
to efficient verification. For a fixed amount of streaming
data, the larger batch is signed at a time, the fewer times
of signature verification is required. We have conducted a
performance study of KOMT. Figure 2 presents a preview
for verification performance under different key distributions
(e.g. the uniform and Zipfian distributions). The use of a
larger batch results in orders of magnitude faster verification.
1) A Baseline Approach: Limited memory space of the
owner is the primary factor that prevents data batch from
increasing infinitely. A straightforward approach for a data
2Consider a simple example for necessity of timing server and time
synchronization, where a data user’s time is on 12/04/2013 while owner’s
time is on 12/03/2013. Then the owner can sign the latest version up to























Figure 2: Verification performance of KOMT
batch setting that is larger than the owner memory is to spill
the data on to disk and load it back upon the signing time.
At the signing time, the data in multiple spill files will be
merged and sorted based on key. This approach, termed on-
disk KOMT, serves as a baseline in this paper. It can have
a data batch as large as the owner disk can accommodate.
However, the main drawback is that it involves expensive
disk IO when the owner ingests the intensive data stream;
it could significantly slow down the sustainable throughput
to ingest the stream. This motivates us to seek a lightweight
authentication structure that can fit into memory yet still be
able to sign a large batch of data.
B. INCBM-TREE: Design and Structure
Our basic idea is to compress the data in memory as much
as possible before the digest and signature are constructed.
Based on the observation that a Bloom filter is a summary
for a (non)-membership test, we propose to combine a
Bloom filter with a Merkle tree for efficient verification of
both correctness and freshness. The structure of INCBM-
TREE is illustrated in Figure 3. Comparing to the traditional
Merkle tree, each tree node in INCBM-TREE maintains not






r: stream arrival rate





br: batch size in real-time publication
bb: batch size in periodic publication
Csig: cost of single digital signature
Cdig: per-record cost of building digest
d: the digest of a stream data batch
q: ratio of INCBM-TREE to KOMT
the key set in the subtree rooted at the node. For a key
set of the subtree, the digest includes a Bloom filter and an
interval of both upper and lower bounds. For instance, a leaf
node 6 maintains a Bloom filter BF6 summarizing key 1 on
node 12 and a hash digest h6. Given node 3 which is the
parent of two leaf nodes (node 6 and node 7), its digest is
a Bloom filter of union of its children nodes’ Bloom filters,
namely BF3 = BF6∪BF7. The range digest is simply with
lower bound 1 and upper bound 23, namely R3 = [1, 23]. It
comes from merging the ranges from its two children, that is,
[1, 23] = [1, 12]∪ [15, 23]. The hash digest is the hash value
of concatenation of all children’s hashes, the range digest,
and the Bloom filters, that is, h3 = H(h6‖h7‖BF3‖R3).
INCBM-TREE uses the following constructs.
R(node) = R(left child) ∪R(right child) (2)
BF (node) = BF (left child) ∪BF (right child)
h(node) = H(h(left child)‖h(right child)‖BF (node)‖R(node))
In a INCBM-TREE, the Bloom filter at every level is of
the same length. The error rate E of a bloom filter can be
estimated using equation E = (1 − e−
Kx
m )K , where K is
the number of hashes used in the Bloom filter and m is the
length of the array used to store bits in Bloom filter, x is
the number of values of the data set summarized in Bloom
filter. Given a pre-defined batch size b and a tolerable error
bound Eb, we can set the length of the Bloom filter l as
follows.





− ln (1 − Eb
1/K)
(4)
For the root node, the error rate is E = Eb. For an internal
node, the number of leaf nodes in the subtree is smaller than
b. Therefore, its actual error rate is bounded by E < Eb.
1) Security Property:
Theorem 3.1: The INCBM-TREE root node can authen-
ticate any bloom filter in the tree structure.
Proof: The proof of security is based on the infeasi-
bility of finding two different Bloom filters BF1 and BF2
such that H(. . . BF1‖ . . . ) = H(. . . BF2‖ . . . ). If this is
feasible, then there exist two values, v1 = . . . BF1‖ . . . and
v2 = . . . BF2‖ . . . , such that H(v1) = H(v2), which clearly
contradicts the fact that H is a collision resistant secure hash.
C. Proof Construction and Verification
The INCBM-TREE is used to construct proof to verify
a result of query VGet. We start the description of proof
construction by an ideal case where a bloom filter is without
error. Following the example in Figure 3, to provide a proof
for freshness on key 98, it suffices to return only two nodes,




































Figure 3: INCBM-TREE structure
test the non-membership of key 98 in the subtree at node 3,
and digest h3 can be used to verify authenticity of BF3.
In reality, a Bloom filter can have a false positive. This
implies that when a key k is not in a set, a Bloom filter
may claim the false membership that k is in the set. In this
case, our strategy is to go down INCBM-TREE by one level.
For instance, when BF3 can not verify the non-membership
of key k, we use the two children’s Bloom filters, BF6
and BF7, which collectively verify the non-membership.
By using multiple lower-level Bloom filters, the chance of
correctly verifying the non-membership becomes higher. In
an extreme case when all the internal nodes’ bloom filters
fail to confirm the non-membership and one reaches a leaf
node, the non-membership or membership can be verified
correctly by going through each element inside the leaf node.
In practice, the INCBM-TREE is built on top of the key-
ordered Merkle tree which can verify the non-membership
by returning an authentication path that covers the queried
key[11], [3]. Given a key-ordered Merkle tree of height c,
this authentication path involves with at most c hash values.
By this way, it can always guarantee error-free verification
(due to the collision resistance of a hash function).
1) Cost Analysis: Although descending the INCBM-
TREE guarantee the error-free of non-membership test, it
inevitably incurs extra verification cost. However, as we
will show below, the probability of descending the INCBM-
TREE decreases exponentially and given a small error rate
bound, the extra cost is expected to be a constant
Because descending one level down only happens when
a parent node is erroneous for answering a non-membership
test, it occurs with a probability equal to the error rate of
the node’s bloom filter. By enforcing all Bloom filters in
INCBM-TREE is of constant error rate E, we can have the
fact that descending N levels down occurs with probability
EN .
Theorem 3.2: In an INCBM-TREE with a Bloom filter,
an error rate bounded by E (E ≪ 0.5) at different tree






Here, cost X is defined to be the number of tree nodes for
error-free verification.
Proof: Suppose the expected cost of a tree node at level
l (l = 0 for leaf nodes) is Xl. There are two cases for query
processing: 1) The tree node’s Bloom filter can correctly
answer the non-membership query, and 2) The tree node
can not. For the first case, it occurs with probability 1−E,
since a Bloom filter’s error rate is E. When the query cost is
1 for a single node, its contribution to the overall expected
cost is (1 − E) · 1. For the second case, it occurs with a
Bloom filter’s error rate E. And the query evaluation needs
to descend into the tree node’s direct children at level l− 1.
The cost should be equal to the sum of expected costs at all
the children nodes. Suppose each tree node has 2 children,
the contribution of the second case to the overall expected
cost is E · 2Xl−1. Overall, we have the following and drive
a closed-form for the expected cost.
Xl = 2E ·Xl−1 + (1− E) (6)
= (2E)2 ·Xl−2 + (1− E)(1 + 2E)
= (2E)3 ·Xl−3 + (1− E)[1 + 2E + (2E)
2]
...
= (2E)l ·X0 + (1− E)[1 + 2E + (2E)










The last step is due to that X0 = c. Because E ≪ 0.5, we
can approximate Xl → X =
1−E
1−2E .
The implication of this theorem is that when E grows
large, the tree node would not be very useful in terms of non-
membership test. For example, when E → 0.5, X → ∞,
making the INCBM-TREE useless. Recall that in Equation
3 E increases with the number of data records b (also the
batch size). The small error rate E is one of the factors
that constrain the growth of a INCBM-TREE during its
construction and limits its batch size. We describe the digest
construction using INCBM-TREE in the next.
D. Digest Construction
In our framework, the data stream is signed on the batch
digest constructed using the root node of INCBM-TREE. We
describe the incremental construction process of an INCBM-
TREE. Algorithm 1 illustrates the construction process; the
incoming data stream is partitioned to small batches and
a KOMT digest is constructed for each batch4. Then, the
4KOMT is used only for small batch of data; it is designed so because
of relative inefficiency of INCBM-TREE with small batch – a bloom filter
for very few records can be a waste of space.
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constructed KOMT digests are put into the leaf level of an
grow INCBM-TREE. In particular, merging two INCBM-
TREE nodes is based on calculation in Equation 2. If it
succeeds in merging, the merged node is promoted to one
level up and replaces the former node. Then the same
merging process repeats, until either it reaches the root node
or there is no former node at the current tree level. During
construction, it only needs to maintain the “frontier” nodes,
but not interior nodes inside the tree, as shown in Figure 4a.
Depending on certain conditions, the final batch digest is
produced by exporting the hash of the highest root. There
are different conditions to trigger a growing INCBM-TREE
to be exported and signed; it could be the hitting of the
memory limit, and/or crossing of the error rate lower bound
of INCBM-TREE.
Algorithm 1 IncBuild(Key-value batch s, incubator p)
1: currentNode←keyOrderedMerkleDigest(s)
2: l ← 0
3: node← p.removeTreeNode(l)
4: loopnode6=NULL
5: currentNode← merge(currentNode, node)




10: if p.overflow() then
11: p.exportINCBM-TREE()
12: end if
E. Implementation and Integration
In implementation, we integrate INCBM-TREE with
KOMT. The memory is utilized 1) to hold the data to
construct KOMT of small batches, and 2) to hold the
Bloom filters of the constructed KOMTs. The proportion of
INCBM-TREE to KOMT denoted by q can be of different
values, ranging from 0 to 1. In practice, the choice of
value q should be bounded by the available memory size.
Since an INCBM-TREE can essentially build arbitrarily large
batches (bounded only exponentially due to the incremental
construction), we do not flush data from memory to a disk
in an INCBM-TREE yet still be able to construct the digest
of the same large batch.
1) Cost Analysis: We analyze the possible batch size
that can be achieved by a limited memory size S. As a
starting point, we first consider the case that the memory is
all dedicated to a KOMT; in this case, the memory can
accommodate batch of size bb =
S
sr
. In our system, a
KOMT only occupies qq+1 of the whole memory, leading
to the batch of KOMTs be able to host bb·qq+1 records. An
INCBM-TREE occupies the rest of memory Sq+1 . Recall
that each leaf node in the INCBM-TREE corresponds to
the dataset of an INCBM-TREE. Suppose the compression
ratio of INCBM-TREE leaf node is p; in other words, given
a dataset of size S·qq+1 , the INCBM-TREE leaf node is of







= pq nodes of the INCBM-TREE. Based on the
property of incremental construction, the INCBM-TREE can
grow up to accommodating 2
p
q leaf nodes, or equivalently, a
KOMT. Therefore, the total batch size of an INCBM-TREE
is up to 2
p
q · bb·qq+1 records.
We further analyze the expected query latency. For an
INCBM-TREE node with an error rate E, the expected cost






1−2E . For the
pure KOMT, it is N/bb · log bb.
F. Real-time Publication
In addition to selection queries, we also consider the
model of real-time stream publication for continuous
queries. In this scenario, particularly, in the presence of
big data stream and powerful clouds, the system bottleneck
would be on the owner side which is of limited resources.
Especially, the rate of how fast the stream can be signed
at the owner side determines how much real-time data can
be delivered to the data users. For intensive data streams, a
saturating scenario may occur when streaming data arrives at
a higher rate than what the data owner’s system can handle.
The system is bounded by CPU utilization due to the need
of frequent signing (by using a batch size to achieve real-
time availability) and it is desirable to have a lightweight
signing approach.
To handle intensive data streams, we have two design
goals in our framework: 1) real-time availability of authen-
ticated streaming data, 2) efficient verification on both real-
time and historical data. To be specific, as data update stream
comes into the system continuously, we want to minimize
and if possible to bound the duration between the time when
it is generated and the time when it is stored in a cloud
and made available to data users. This real-time processing
is important to many latency sensitive applications, ranging
from marketing in stock exchange to real-time social news
mining. For verification efficiency, the verification cost is
dominated by that of historical or static data that are updated
long time ago. To authenticate freshness of such data, the
proof need to be presented in a way that enables verification
all the way from an old time to now or a recent time.
To approach the design goals, our key observation is
that batch size is critical to both the real-time-ness and
verification overhead. On the one hand, a small batch size
reduces the time lapse between data generation and the time
when the data become available. On the other hand, a large
batch size means high verification efficiency especially for
historical data (which will be elaborated in §III-A). There-
fore, in this work, we propose a multi-granularity signing
framework, in which the raw update stream is batched and
signed twice, respectively in small batches for real-time












































(b) System of outsourced stream with INCBM-TREE
Figure 4: INCBM-TREE operations and systems
The following two sections respectively describe the design
and system of our framework for real-time and periodic
publications. The system implementation and deployment of
these two components are flexible; they can be co-located
in a single machine or two separate machines.5
1) Cost Optimization: We formulate the per-record sign-
ing cost for optimized computation. We first consider the
cost model of our framework. To sign a data stream the
cost includes the cost of building digest Cdig(b). It can be
described as
Cdig(b) = Cdig · b log b, (7)
where Cdig is the cost of a hash operation and b log b is
the cost of building a (binary) Merkle tree on b records
and sorting. Given l records in a stream with a configured
batch size b, the overall signing cost Cpubl consists of
the cost to build the digests, namely lbCdig, and the cost
of applying digital signatures, namely lbCsig. Note
l
b is
the number of batches for l records in the stream. By







+ Cdig log b (8)
Our goal is to minimize the per-record signing cost y. We

















2) Real-time Stream Publication: We consider the prob-
lem of signing data stream in real time. Formally, we assume
the end user has a maximal tolerable delay e for signing. The
5Currently we do not address the interference of these two system
components when co-deployed on a single machine, which is the focus








Figure 5: Evaluation system overview
stream has an arrival rate r. This yields the upper bound of
batch size of real-time signing, denoted by br, as follows.
br ≤ r · e (10)
By combining Equation 9 and Equation 10, we can have






, if bopt ≤ r · e




We implemented a stream authentication system using
INCBM-TREE to evaluate the applicability of INCBM-
TREE to generic key-value stores and the performance
of INCBM-TREE. Our implementation is mostly based
on the cryptographic library provided by JAVA (i.e.
javax.crypto.*), and utilized RSA as signature
schemes. Our implementation also includes various digest
structures, such as KOMT and INCBM-TREE, and main
system components for verification, such as a signer on the
data owner side, a verifier on the data user side, and a prover
on the cloud side.
To evaluate the end-to-end stream authentication perfor-
mance, we built a client-sever system as depicted in Figure 5.
We utilized Yahoo! Cloud Serving Benchmark (YCSB)6, an
industrial standard benchmarking tool, to simulate key-value
workloads for comprehensive performance measurement.
6https://github.com/brianfrankcooper/YCSB/wiki
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In particular, we used a write-only workload generator
with the provided key distributions to simulate the stream
source of web applications used in Yahoo!. We also used a
read-only workload generator to simulate data users posing
queries to a cloud. Since a cloud is typically not a per-
formance bottleneck, all the data in our experiments in a
cloud is processed on a memory. To bridge clients with a
remote cloud, we used an RPC library based on Google’s
ProtoBuf and JBoss’s Netty. In order to make the RPC cost
less intrusive to our evaluation results, we chose to invoke
multiple operations, e.g., verifications of multiple queries in
a single RPC call.
1) Equipments: We conducted our experiments in Em-
ulab. The experiments were performed on two machines: a
weak machine for clients (i.e., a data owner and a data user)
and a powerful machine for a server (i.e., a cloud). The
powerful machine was equipped with one 2.4 GHz 64-bit
Quad Core Xeon processor (with hyper-threading support)
and 12 GB RAM. The less powerful machine was equipped
with 3 GHz processor, 2 GB RAM, and 300 GB disk.
2) Comparison: In our evaluation, we assumed that the
batch size was too large to fit into a data owner’s memory
because a data owner would have a limited computing power
in a typical data outsourcing scenario. A data owner would
need to flush the streaming data to a disk when a memory
cannot hold the entire stream.
We considered KOMT as the baseline for performance
comparison in that KOMT has been widely used in prior
steam authentication work [11], [8]. We compared the per-
formance of INCBM-TREE to the performance of the on-
disk KOMT. On-disk KOMT is a variant of KOMT to
support a large batch size; however, it may need to retrieve
the data from a disk and perform a merge sort to sign all
the data. We set the same batch size for INCBM-TREE for
fair performance comparison. However, note that INCBM-
TREE can be constructed incrementally without holding
entire data before signing. In our experiments, we evaluated
two different INCBM-TREE to KOMT ratios, e.g., 0.1 and
0.2. We fixed the error rate of Bloom filters as 0.1.
B. Micro-benchmark
1) Proof Construction Cost: We measured the proof
construction cost for non-membership by varying the error
rate of Bloom filters in INCBM-TREE. We changed the size
of a Bloom filter to change error rates. Under each setting,
we repeated the experiments for 1000 times and plotted the
average of the proof sizes in Figure 6. With small error
rates (e.g., < 10%), the proof size was very small, e.g.,
slightly above 1. With large error rates (e.g., ≥ 10%), the
proof size exponentially increased as shown in Figure 6b.
The result was consistent with our cost analysis discussed
in Equation 5.
2) Bandwidth Cost of Publication: In order to evaluate
the bandwidth cost of publication, we measured the size of




















(a) Small error rate

















(b) Large error rate
Figure 6: Effect of the error rate of a Bloom filter on the
constructed proof size (Y axis in a log scale)
constructed digests. A digest size matters a lot to a cloud
where a digest has to be fully materialized. We measured the
digest size for INCBM-TREE while varying the data size.
We also included the size of digital signatures as comparison
points as shown in Figure 7a. A digest size, measured by the
number of hash values, increased linearly to the data size,
measured by the number of records in the stream. A digest
was significantly larger than a signature, which supported
our design choice where we did not transmit a digest to a
cloud.
3) Maximal Batch Size: We measured the maximal batch
size that can be achieved under the constraint of varying
memory sizes. As depicted in Figure 7b, the maximal
batch size of KOMT was linearly bounded by the memory
size while the maximal batch size of INCBM-TREE was
exponentially bounded. With different ratios q, the maximal
batch size differs. A large value of q (e.g., q = 0.2) means
more space is dedicated to INCBM-TREE and a big batch
can be constructed.





































(b) Maximal batch size
Figure 7: INCBM-TREE digest size and maximal batch size
C. Write Performance
We comprehensively evaluated the write performance
when publishing stream with large batches. A large batch
size is desirable for a better performance as discussed in
§III-A.
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1) Experiment Setup: We measured the performance of
ingesting a data stream. In our setup, 300 million key-
value pairs were produced by YCSB’s workload-A gener-
ator [18] under a Zipf key distribution, and were fed into
the owner-side signer. While driving the workload to the
system, we measured the sustained throughput and latency
over the course of time. In a simulated environment, we
only measured the overhead from digest construction and
signature generation. We saturated the system by setting the
targeted throughput to be higher than sustainable throughput.
We fixed the compression ratio of a Bloom filter as 50, that
is, the size of a Bloom filter was less than 150 of the data
size.
2) Time-series Results: The time-series result was re-
ported in Figure 8a. We did not include the initial data
loading stage to exclude unstable system factors, e.g., cold
cache. While the throughput of INCBM-TREE remained
stable and high, the throughput of KOMT fluctuated along
the timeline. At the valley points, KOMT was performing
heavy disk I/Os to flush overflowing data and to load data
from a disk to a memory for signing. Due to the reason,
the average throughput of KOMT was lower than that of
INCBM-TREE.
3) Average Throughput: We repeated the above primitive
experiments multiple times under different settings and
reported their average. We first varied batch sizes under a
fixed memory size 0.5GB so that tested batch sizes were
always bigger than memory sizes. Figure 8b reports the
throughput. INCBM-TREE achieved an order of magnitude
higher average throughput than on-disk KOMT. As the
batch size increased, the throughput of KOMT decreased
because more disk accesses were required for signing. The
throughput of INCBM-TREE remained almost the same
across various batch sizes because of the incremental digest
construction. INCBM-TREE achieved much higher through-
put than KOMT due to the pure memory operations without
disk I/O. We then varied the memory size under the fixed
batch size of 4GB. As described in Figure 8c, the throughput
of KOMT increased with larger memory size mainly because
of fewer disk I/Os. The throughput of INCBM-TREE were
remained stable with different memory sizes.
D. Query Performance
1) Experiment Setup: We further conducted experiments
to measure the query performance, specifically the veri-
fication cost. In our setup, we used the write workload
generator to populate data to a cloud, and the cloud rebuilt
digest structures, e.g., KOMT and INCBM-TREE. Then,
we used YCSB with a read-only configuration to generate
query workload to the cloud. The query keys were generated
by YCSB workload-A generator. Upon receiving queries, a
prover prepared query results with proofs in a cloud. We
were not interested in the performance of a cloud because
a cloud is typically not a performance bottleneck; thus we
were mainly concerned with the performance of the client-
side, e.g., the user-side verification cost.
A data user issued a series of read requests to retrieves
proofs from a cloud and verify them. We used a YCSB
framework to measure the elapsed time. During the exper-
iments, we varied an update intensity that determined the
time interval between the query time ts and the time of the
last update tslatest.
2) Verification Performance: We compared the verifica-
tion performance of INCBM-TREE with the performance
of on-memory KOMT with a small batch size. We used the
verification time and the proof size, measured by the number
of hashes or signatures included in a proof, to evaluate
the verification performance. In term of the verification
time (Figure 9a) and the proof size (Figure 9b), INCBM-
TREE outperformed KOMT. The result demonstrated the
non-membership test of INCBM-TREE was highly efficient
for freshness verification. On the contrary, KOMT could
utilize only a small batch size due to memory constraint. The
performance gap between INCBM-TREE and on-memory
KOMT was little in Figure 9b because on-memory KOMT
could return more signatures than INCBM-TREE with the
same proof size.






































Figure 9: Verification performance
V. RELATED WORK
Security issues such as data integrity and confidentiality
have become increasingly concerned in cloud computing and
in an outsourced database scenario. Hacigumus et al. intro-
duced general security issues in an outsourced database [19].
There has been many emerging work addressing the confi-
dentiality issue in outsourced data [20], [21], [22]. Our work
is complementary as we address data integrity and authentic-
ity. Recently, several work has been proposed to address the
query authentication for outsourced databases [1], [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7]. Their proposed methods were specialized to
specific data types (e.g., raw data or meta-data) and specific
data models (e.g., a database or data streams). Early work
focused on a traditional database model and often required
a data owner to keep a full local copy of the original data
for data updates. By contrast, our work, which also focuses
10







































(b) Varying batch sizes



















(c) Varying memory sizes
Figure 8: Stream write performance
on authentication of queries, allow the querier to verify the
correctness of query results while minimizing data owner’s
computation requirements.
Existing work often employed collision-resistant hash
functions and digital signatures to construct verifiable ob-
jects that were returned along with query results to a data
client for the verification purpose. For example, signature
chaining was used to construct authentication information
on top of data structures, such as KD-tree and R tree to
guarantee query completeness and authenticity [5], [1].
Merkle hash tree (MHT) [23] is Another commonly used
authentication structure. Specifically, Devanbu et al. [2]
presented a general framework to publish data based on a
Merkle tree that allows a data client to authenticate query
answers. Pang and Tan [7] combined a Merkle tree with a B-
tree where each internal node was associated with a signed
digest that were derived from all tuples in the subtree. This
allowed a verification object to be constructed regardless of
tree sizes and be efficiently verified by edge servers. Yang et
al. [6] proposed a similar approach by embedding a Merkle
tree into a R-tree to support fast query processing and
verification. Merkle trees have been considered to used to
authenticate (non)-membership [24], [25], [26], yet most of
them consider a static dataset scenario. Li et al. [3] discussed
dynamic scenarios where a data owner was allowed to
update database records. However, due to the use of a Merkle
tree, updating database records entailed expensive overhead
of revoking and recomputing digital signatures.
More recently, as a streaming data model becomes in-
creasingly popular in the big data era, authenticating data
streams has attracted significant attentions from research
communities. To address unique challenges, such as data
freshness and lightweight authentication required by the
intensive streaming models, several approaches were pro-
posed including [27], [28], [11], [8]. For example, proof-
infused stream [11] considered a streaming data model
of continuous data updates and window-based queries. It
addressed data freshness only on sliding window queries
with various predicates (e.g., ranges on multiple data keys).
Result freshness of streaming data was discussed in [9] in
the context of global aggregations instead of fine-grained
(or per-version) selection queries. CAT [29] tackled a query
model close to our work, but freshness was provided by
expensive update-in-place actions which was not applicable
to a intensive stream scenario. CADS [8] built KOMT on
top of TOMT (a variant of KOMT to support temporal
completeness); however it still required recomputing the
hash values and digital signatures.
The main difference of INCBM-TREE from previous
approaches is the support of lightweight authentication of
intensive data streams with freshness (temporal complete-
ness) guarantees. Most existing work ensured freshness
of query results via either coarse-grained window-based
approach which only guaranteed data freshness for recent
time window [11] or revoking and resigning of the entire
dataset which made them less desirable for an data streaming
scenario [3], [8].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we highlighted and articulated the problem
of providing data freshness assurance for outsourced multi-
version key-value stores. We proposed INCBM-TREE, a
novel authentication structure which offers a set of desirable
properties in stream authentication: 1) lightweight for both
data owners and end clients, 2) optimized for intensive data
update streams, and 3) adaptive to varying delay tolerance.
Through extensive benchmark evaluation, we demonstrated
INCBM-TREE provided throughput improvement (in an
order of magnitude) for data stream authentication than ex-
isting work. The superior performance makes our approach
applicable particularly to data owners and clients with weak
computational capabilities, which is typical for outsourcing
scenarios.
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